The Supreme Court’s “Presumptive Immunity” Standard

An especially baffling aspect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. United States is its concept of “presumptive” presidential immunity. The Court ruled that a president’s exercise of “core” powers is “absolutely” immune from prosecution and added that it might hold the exercise of “noncore” powers absolutely immune as well. For now, however, the Court held a president’s use of “noncore” powers only “presumptively” immune. Prosecution of a former president for using a noncore power to commit a crime can proceed if the government can show that this prosecution would pose “no dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.” (I’ll call this standard the “no dangers” test.)

The words “no dangers” underscore the Court’s view that even a slight risk of inhibiting a legitimate exercise of presidential power outweighs the benefit of encouraging presidents to refrain from crimes. As the Court understands the Constitution, legal restraint vanishes when an outside chance of overdeterrence appears. Moreover, the Court required prosecutors to prove the absence of this outside chance without offering a hint of how they might do so.

The Court’s exclusive focus on over-deterrence and its disregard of the risk of under-deterrence are astonishing (especially in light of the facts alleged in Trump’s case), but I maintain in this article that the “no dangers” test isn’t as demanding as it seems. It allows well-founded prosecutions for serious crimes. These prosecutions do not pose a danger of intrusion on legitimate functions of the executive branch.

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